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I. INTRODUCTION
Could an opinion of the Supreme Court signed onto by only four
Justices become binding precedent? What about one signed by three
Justices? Can you go so far as to say an opinion signed onto by only a
single Justice can be binding precedent? The answer is yes, and many
opinions signed onto by less than a majority of the Court are consistently
cited by lower courts as precedent.' The reasons for this occurrence can
be directly attributed to the use of concurring opinions, which has led to
a mass of plurality opinions issued by the Court.2
The second half of the twentieth century has seen a significant rise
in dissension in the Court. 3 That dissension has continued to exist, even
in the current Court whose Chief Justice has made it a mission to
promote unanimity.4 Cases that include multiple concurrences and
dissents are common, especially in high profile cases.5 Justices continue
to write concurring opinions for a majority of cases, 6 leading to a
1. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711, 731 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333, 338 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring); Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l
Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
2. See Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of Concurrence by
the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 777, 811 (1989-90) (examining various types
of concurring opinions and their relation to plurality opinions).
3. See Louis Lusky, Fragmentation of the Supreme Court: An Inquiry Into Causes,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1982) (gathering data that shows the rise in
concurrences).
4. See David Von Drehle, The Incredibly Shrinking Court, TIME, Oct. 11, 2007 at
40 (highlighting Chief Justice Roberts and his views on uniting a fractured Court).
5. Two of the most controversial cases of the Court's 2006 term had numerous
concurring and dissenting opinions. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1 et al., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (dealing with school segregation); Morse v.
Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007) ("Bong Hits 4 Jesus").
6. See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term, 122 HARV. L. REv. 516 (2007) [hereinafter
Harvard Stats] (compiling statistics of the Supreme Court's 2007 term).
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fragmented Court whose decisions lack clear precedential value and lead
to confusion amongst lower courts The problem will continue until a
solution is found that will help unify the Court and eliminate the
dissension.
This Comment will examine the problem of concurring opinions
and their relation to plurality opinions. Part II will discuss the
background and history of the Supreme Court's method of deciding
cases, from the Court's inception to present day. It will trace the rise in
the twentieth century of the concurring opinion, and the subsequent rise
in the number of plurality opinions. Part II will also analyze several
cases containing plurality opinions and the inherent ambiguity in
plurality opinions. Part III will delve into the various solutions that legal
theorists have proposed to deal with the problem and analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of each solution. Part III will then propose a
new solution to the problem of plurality opinions that, in general,
consists of enacting a new Court rule that would eliminate concurring
opinions altogether and force the Court to issue a single, majority
opinion of the Court.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Supreme Court Decision Making
When the Supreme Court was originally created, it based its
decision making process on the old English tradition of seriatim
8opinions. In a seriatim opinion Court, each member of the Court writes
his or her own opinion for the case. 9 This practice is very different than
the modem day Court's practice of deciding cases with a majority
opinion. The practice of seriatim opinions has no constitutional basis, as
the Constitution is relatively silent on how the Supreme Court should
decide cases.'0 As a result of seriatim opinions, ambiguities in the law
existed, and the cases the Court decided lacked definitive reasoning."
7. See Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality
Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1593, 1595 (1992); Ray, supra note 2, at 778; John F.
Davis & William L. Reynolds, Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme
Court, 1974 DuKE L.J. 59, 71 (1974).
8. See Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality
Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 261, 263
(2000).
9. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (using a seriatim opinion to decide
the case).
10. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
11. See Hochschild, supra note 8, at 263-67; Igor Kirman, Standing Apart To Be A
Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 2083, 2085-86 (1995).
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Each member wrote how he interpreted the case, and it was up to those
who read the opinions to discern what precedent the Court was
establishing. This practice led to an early Supreme Court that was not
very effective and did not establish itself as the head of a strong
independent branch of government. 
12
When John Marshall became Chief Justice in 1801, he used his
superior intelligence and natural leadership to revolutionize the Court.13
His most revolutionary innovation was the use of majority opinions to
decide cases. 14 Marshall realized that the practice of seriatim opinions
was confusing and diminished the precedential value of the Court's
decisions.1 5 His solution was to use majority opinions that would
establish a single precedent.' 6  In most cases the opinions were
unanimous, as Marshall believed having all the Justices behind one
opinion gave it more force and respect.17 The use of majority opinions
enabled the Court to establish itself as a major force within the judicial
branch of government along side the executive and legislative
branches. 18
The use of majority opinions reinforced the idea of majoritarianism,
or the principle that lower courts must identify a "majority rule" that a
majority of Justices have adopted. 9 This reliance on a majority echoes
the tenants of democracy and fairness upon which the United States was
founded.2 ° In the United States, congressmen are elected based on the
recipient of the majority of votes, laws are passed only when a majority
in congress votes on the law, and Presidents are elected if they secure a
majority of electors.2' It seems logical that if cases are to be decided by
a group of Justices, a majority of them must be required for the ruling to
12. See Kirman, supra note 11, at 2086.
13. See Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (2005-06) (examining John Marshall's tenure on the Supreme
Court).
14. See John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme
Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 141 (1999) (discussing the evolution of the way
the Supreme Court decides cases); Kirman, supra note 11, at 2086-87.
15. See Hochschild, supra note 8, at 267.
16. See Hobson, supra note 13, at 1442; Hochschild, supra note 8, at 267; Kirman,
supra note 11, at 2086-87.
17. See Hobson, supra note 13, at 1443; Kelsh, supra note 14, at 149.
18. See Hobson, supra note 13, at 1421; Kelsh, supra note 14, at 143-44. While
history has legitimized Marshall's switch to majority opinions, at the time one of the
most vocal critics of the switch was Thomas Jefferson. See id. at 145-46.
19. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1596.
20. Both the Declaration of Independence and Constitution espouse the right of
people to be fairly represented. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 & art. II, § I (instituting majority elections for the House of
Representatives and the President being elected by a majority of electors).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
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be binding. The principle of majoritarianism is linked with the doctrine
of stare decisis, under which lower courts must follow as binding
precedent past Court opinions with a majority support of the Justices.22
The American legal system relies heavily on stare decisis to help make
the law more efficient and uniform. 3
After the Marshall Court, use of majority opinions became the
primary method for the Court to decide cases.24 Yet, the principle of
majoritarianism began to be chipped away at as dissension among the
Justices began to rise in the twentieth century. 25  This dissension
emerged as a result of the concurring opinion26-an additional opinion
written in support of the majority judgment, but adding or subtracting
reasoning to reach that judgment.27 Although concurring opinions
existed during the Marshall Court, they were rare.28 Even after the
Marshall Court, the use of concurring opinions did not substantially
increase until the twentieth century, especially during the last half of the
century.29
B. The Emergence of the Concurring Opinion
The trend began in the 1930s when Justice Frankfurter brought back
the practice of writing concurring opinions.3° In Graves v. New York ex
rel. 0 'Keefe, Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion which agreed in the
judgment, but added Frankfurter's own reasoning as to why the Court
should reach that judgment.31 Frankfurter also specifically advocated the
use of concurring opinions for Justices to express their own opinions on a
case. 32 At the time, concurring opinions were very rare, and it was a bold
step for Frankfurter to advocate for their use.33 After Frankfurter
restarted this trend, the Justices' use of concurring opinions skyrocketed
22. See Linda Novak, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions,
80 COLUM. L. REv. 756, 757 (1980). See generally James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare
Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41 (1979) (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis in the United
States).
23. See Parisis G. Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of
Civil Rights and Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 11 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 335, 339
(1991).
24. See Hochschild, supra note 8, at 270; Kelsh, supra note 14, at 152.
25. See Kirman, supra 11, at 2087.
26. See id.
27. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 245 (8th ed. 2005).
28. See Kelsh, supra note 14, at 146-52.
29. See Kirman, supra note 11, at 2087.
30. See Lusky, supra note 3, at 1143.
31. Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
32. Id.
33. See Lusky, supra note 3, at 1143.
2009]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
in the subsequent decades.34 In the 1936-1937 term, there was only a
single use of a concurring opinion out of 149 opinions of the Court.35 By
1980 there were 79 concurring opinions out of 149 opinions of the
Court.
36 In the 2007-2008 term, the percentage of concurring opinions
remained constant, with the number of concurring opinions being more
than half the number of opinions of the Court.
37
In addition to Justice Frankfurter's use of the concurring opinion,
another reason for the increase in concurring opinions can be attributed
to the Court becoming less reliant on a textual analysis of the
Constitution, causing more innovations in interpretation of the
Constitution.38 These innovations have created more ambiguity in
constitutional law and more room for disagreement between Justices.39
Other reasons for the rise in concurring opinions that have been
proposed by legal scholars include the passage of the Judiciary Act of
1925, the ineffective leadership of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and
the increased attention paid to the individual thinking of Justices.40 It
seems that the rise of concurring opinions and disagreement in the Court
most likely is a convergence of many of these issues and cannot be
reduced to merely one cause.
C. From Concurring Opinions to Plurality Opinions
This increase in concurring opinions has led to an increase in the
number of plurality opinions.4 1 A plurality opinion occurs when there is
no majority opinion signed onto by five or more Justices.42 In a typical
case, the Court will have five or more Justices vote in favor of the
judgment of the case, such as reversing or affirming the lower court's
judgment n3  Then the Court will issue a single opinion of the Court
setting forth the reasoning for that judgment;44 the opinion of the Court is
signed onto by all the Justices that voted for the judgment.45 The Justices
34. See id. at 1138; Ray, supra note 2, at 778.
35. Lusky, supra note 3, at 1138.
36. Id.
37. Although the caseload for the Supreme Court has declined dramatically since
1980, out of 70 cases decided in 2007-2008, there were 45 concurring opinions. See
Harvard Stats, supra note 6, at 516.
38. See Lusky, supra note 3, at 1147-48.
39. See id.
40. See Kelsh, supra note 14, at 178-80.
41. See Hochschild, supra note 8, at 272-73.
42. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 922 (8th ed. 2005).
43. See LAWRENCE BAUN, THE SUPREME COURT 130-37 (7th ed. 2001) (explaining





voting against the judgment, however, do not sign onto the opinion of the
Court, and they might also write their own dissenting opinion.4 6
The problem arises when Justices write concurring opinions in
addition to the single opinion of the Court. When this situation occurs,
determining what part of the opinion, if any, is precedent becomes a
numbers question as to how many Justices are agreeing with each
opinion. If the votes for the judgment are five to four, and the fifth
Justice for the majority writes his or her own opinion that does not agree
with the opinion of the Court, the opinion of the Court has only four
Justices assenting to it and becomes a plurality opinion. A plurality
opinion is simply an opinion that has the most Justices agreeing to it, but
not a majority of Justices.47
The main problem that occurs when a case is decided by a plurality
opinion is that two separate interpretations of law emerge from the Court.
The main plurality opinion espouses one view of interpreting the case,
while the concurring opinion espouses another view. In some cases there
is even a third opinion that states a third view, such as when a Justice
writes a dissenting opinion or a second concurrence. These views are
frequently in direct conflict with each other; neither view has a majority
of the Court endorsing it and, thus, neither is considered to be
automatically-binding precedent.48  Consequently, lower courts are
uncertain as to the proper interpretation that should be used to decide
future cases of a similar nature.4 9 This uncertainty among the lower
courts can lead to ambiguity in the lawi 0
D. Major Plurality Opinion Cases
1. Teague v. Lane
There are many Supreme Court cases that have plurality opinions,
four of which particularly show the ambiguity inherent in these opinions.
For example, in Teague v. Lane51 an all white jury convicted Frank
46. For further discussion on dissenting opinions, see Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.,
The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 583
(1994); Meredith Kolsky, Justice William Johnson and the History of the Supreme Court
Dissent, 83 GEO. L.J. 2069 (1995); Kevin M. Stack, The Practice of Dissent in the
Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 2235 (1996).
47. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 922 (8th ed. 2005).
48. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1596-97.
49. See discussion infra Part II.D.
50. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1595; Ray, supra note 2, at 778; Davis & Reynolds,
supra note 7, at 71.
51. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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Teague, a black man, of attempted murder.52 During jury selection the
prosecutor used all ten of his peremptory challenges to exclude black
jurors.53 Teague appealed the conviction, and the case eventually
reached the Supreme Court. 54 The Court looked at whether a recently-
decided case 55 that would favor Teague could be applied retroactively
56
and, if it could not be applied, whether the previous law at the time
would apply in overturning the conviction.57 The Court upheld the
conviction with a seven to two vote.58 Of the seven that voted for the
judgment, there was a main plurality opinion with multiple parts on
which not all the Justices agreed.59 Five Justices agreed to parts I and III
of the opinion, seven agreed to part II, and four agreed to parts IV and V.
In addition, two Justices agreed to a separate concurring opinion, and
another Justice wrote a concurring opinion in which another Justice
agreed to Part I, but not to Part 11.60
Untangling plurality opinions is a difficult task for lower courts and
one that can leave lower courts confused as to the case's actual
precedential value. In the Teague plurality opinion, Parts I, II, and III
would be considered precedent because at least five Justices signed onto
those sections. 61 The remaining opinions all have less than five Justices
signing onto them, making their precedential value questionable at best.
Parts IV and V state the Court's reasoning on when to retroactively apply
rules to decided cases, 62 yet only four Justices signed onto that reasoning
with Justice White specifically disagreeing with the reasoning and
writing his own interpretation of when to retroactively apply a Court
decision.63 Justice Stevens also wrote a separate concurring opinion,
further muddling the precedent by stating his own interpretation on how
to retroactively apply Court decisions, and disagreeing with the
application of case law in the main plurality opinion.64 To confuse things
even further, Justice Steven's concurrence was joined by another Justice
with respect to the first, but not the second part.
It is evident that the Supreme Court in Teague failed to articulate a
clear standard for lower courts to apply in future cases. Instead, they
52. Id. at 292.
53. Id. at 293.
54. Id.
55. See Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
56. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294.
57. Id. at 296, 299.
58. Id. at 288.
59. Id. at291.
60. Id. at 291.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 299-316.
63. Id. at 316-18 (White, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 318-23 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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created a confusing tangle of opinions, with several sections failing to
secure majority support. This confusion does not promote the
consistency of the law and hinders the Supreme Court's role as the
deciding voice on questions of law.
2. Branzburg v. Hayes
Another particularly confusing plurality opinion appears in the case
Branzburg v. Hayes.65 In Branzburg, the Court ruled five to four that
reporters do not have a constitutional right to refuse to testify about
confidential sources before a grand jury.6 6 Notably, Justice Powell wrote
a concurring opinion, which many have interpreted to directly conflict
with the opinion of the Court.67 Justice Powell's opinion employs a more
narrow interpretation of the holding and sets forth a balancing test to
determine whether reporters have a constitutional protection against
testifying before a grand jury.6 8 Powell's opinion differs from the
opinion of the Court, which gives no constitutional protection to
reporters who are forced to testify before a grand jury.6 9 Many have
argued that Justice Powell's concurring opinion takes away his vote from
the opinion of the Court, transforming the opinion of the Court to a mere
plurality opinion that only has the assent of four Justices. °
The case is muddled further by the fact that Justice Powell began his
concurring opinion with the phrase, "Mr. Justice Powell, concurring.7 y
Usually a Justice will use the phrase "concurring in part," "concurring in
the judgment," or "concurring in the result. '72 These phrases indicate
that the Justice agrees with the judgment of the case but not with the
Court's reasoning for that judgment. Justice Powell neglected to add any
of these phrases to his opinion; he merely stated "concurring." Some
lower courts have ruled that this phrase shows that Justice Powell
concurred with both the judgment and reasoning of the Court, and that
his opinion was simply a further addition to the main opinion of the
65. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
66. Id. at 708.
67. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 710.
69. Id. at 708 (plurality opinion).
70. See Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1951, 1954 (2006); see also United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968-69
(5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Model Magazine Distribs., Inc. (In re Grand Jury 87-3
Subpoena Duces Tecum), 955 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Matter,
Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 990 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1985); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467
(9th Cir. 1975).
71. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. See West, supra note 70, at 1953.
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Court.7 3 This argument, however, can be rebutted on the grounds that
Justice Powell's opinion clearly opposes the main reasoning of the
opinion of the Court. 74 This case is obviously confusing and has led to a
circuit split on which of the two opinions to follow as precedent.
75
3. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.
provides an example of a plurality opinion case where the concurring
opinion is cited to far more often than the opinion of the Court.76 In
Commonwealth Coatings, the Court examined the standard of review for
evident partiality in arbitration.77 The Court decided the case by a five to
four vote, yet only four Justices joined the main opinion of the Court.78
The fifth Justice, Justice White, voted for the judgment, but wrote his
own concurring opinion.79  The main opinion of the Court uses the
language "appearance of bias" as the standard of review for evident
partiality. 80 Justice White, on the other hand, seems to advocate a less
restrictive standard of review. 81 He does not embrace the "appearance"
language, but he also does not specifically reject it.82 The vagueness of
73. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
("[W]hatever Justice Powell specifically intended, he joined the majority."); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, Scarce, 5 F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Although Justice Powell
wrote a separate concurrence, he also signed Justice White's opinion, providing the fifth
vote necessary to establish it as the majority opinion of the Court."); Storer Commc'ns,
Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987)
("Justice Powell's concurring opinion is entirely consistent with the majority opinion, and
neither limits nor expands upon its holding . .
74. See West, supra note 70, at 1953.
75. Compare United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Model Magazine Distribs., Inc. (In re Grand Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum),
955 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury Matter, Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 990 n.2
(3rd Cir. 1985); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating White's
concurrence makes the opinion of the Court a plurality opinion) with In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Scarce, 5
F.3d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1993); Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury
Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating opinion of the Court is a
majority opinion).
76. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
77. Evident Partiality is defined as bias of the arbitrator towards or against one side
in an arbitration. See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2007).
78. Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 145.
79. Id. at 150 (White, J., concurring).
80. Id. (Opinion of the Court).




Justice White's concurrence has led to a large amount of debate and
confusion over the Court's true holding.83
Lower courts have wrestled with what standard of review to use: the
"appearance of bias" standard from the main opinion of the Court, or the
less strict standard from Justice White's concurring opinion.84  A
majority of courts choose to adopt the standard from White's
concurrence, even though it was signed onto by only two Justices.85 The
main opinion of the Court, on the other hand, has only been cited as
precedent in a single circuit court.
86
4. Memoirs v. Massachusetts
The case, A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure' v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,87 is another example of
a case that had a problem-causing plurality opinion. Memoirs was a First
Amendment, freedom-of-speech case where the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts deemed a book written in 1790 as obscene. 88 The United
States Supreme Court overruled that decision with a six to three majority
vote. 89  In overruling the decision, there were three different
interpretations on why that judgment should be reached. One
interpretation was endorsed by three Justices, another by two Justices,
and still a third had only one Justice. 90 The first interpretation set forth a
three-part test for obscenity and ruled that the lower court incorrectly
applied that test with respect to the third prong; therefore, the Court
found the material was not obscene. 9' The second interpretation stated
that the First Amendment protected all speech, and that a law banning
expression, not coupled with illegal activity, was unconstitutional.92 The
third opinion only stated that any suppression of expression that is not
83. See Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d
278, 281-85 (5th Cir. 2007) (providing a detailed discussion on the current debate over
Commonwealth Coatings and relevant court cases).
84. See id.
85. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Comp. v. Home Ins. Comp, 429 F.3d 640, 645 (6th
Cir. 2005); JCI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 324 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir.
2003); Morelite Const. Corp. v. N.Y. City Dist. Council Carpenter's Benefit Fund, 748
F.2d 79, 82-83 (2nd Cir. 1984); Ormsbee Dev. Comp. v. Grace v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 668
F.2d 1140, 1150 (10th Cir. 1982).
86. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the
"appearance of bias" standard from the main opinion of the Court).
87. A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure' v. Attorney
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
88. Id. at 415.
89. Id. at 421.
90. Id. at414, 421, 424.
91. Id. at418-19.
92. Id. at 426 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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hardcore pornography is unconstitutional, and the book was not hardcore
pornography.
93
Because of these three different interpretations, lower courts had
difficulty finding any binding precedent from this case.94 Eventually, in
response to the lower courts' confusion, the Supreme Court looked at the
Memoirs case again and set forth the Marks's Narrowest-Grounds
Doctrine, the Court's answer to the question of how plurality opinions
should be interpreted by lower courts.95
III. ANALYSIS
A. Solutions to the Problem of Plurality Opinions
The Marks Doctrine is amongst a number of solutions that have
been proposed in dealing with the inherent confusion of plurality
opinions. In addition to the Marks Doctrine, legal theorists have
proposed using only the actual judgment itself as precedent, 96 having the
plurality opinion itself be precedent, 97 using a hybrid application,98 and
using a legitimacy model of interpretation.99 Each of these theories will
be discussed in turn below.
1. Narrowest Grounds Doctrine
The Supreme Court addressed the problems with interpreting
plurality opinions in Marks v. United States. 00 In Marks, the Court had
to determine what was the actual holding of a case that it decided several
years earlier. The prior case was Memoirs v. Massachusetts',
°H
discussed earlier in this Comment. Marks hinged on the holding of
Memoirs, and the Court laid out a narrowest-grounds doctrine to
determine that holding. 
102
93. Id. at 421; see also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
94. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192 (1977) (discussing how lower
court found Memoirs rule never became law because it never had the assent of more than
three Justices).
95. Id. at 193.
96. See Mark Alan Thurmon, When The Court Divides: Reconsidering the
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 420 (1992).
97. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1600-01.
98. See Thurmon, supra note 96, at 451.
99. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1610.
100. Marks, 430 U.S. at 188.
101. A Book Named 'John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure' v. Attorney
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
102. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.
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Under a narrowest-grounds doctrine, "When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."'10 3 In other words, when applying the narrowest-
grounds doctrine, lower courts must look at all of the opinions in a case
that support the majority judgment, and the opinion that interprets the
law using the narrowest approach becomes the binding precedent. In
Marks, the Court found the plurality opinion of the Court was the
narrowest application of the law and, therefore, the binding precedent.
10 4
Since the Marks case, the narrowest-grounds doctrine has been
applied by lower courts to interpret fragmented opinions, but results
under this doctrine continue to vary.' 0 5 The main problem with the
doctrine is that lower courts are unclear as to which opinion is in fact the
narrowest application. 10 6 If a lower court cannot determine conclusively
the opinion with the narrowest application, there will still be confusion
over which opinion's reasoning to apply as precedent.
10 7
2. Making only the Judgment Precedent
Another solution to the precedential ambiguity of plurality opinions
is to make only the judgment itself the binding precedent.'0 8 The
judgment in the case would be binding, but the written opinions of the
Court would be limited to mere persuasive precedent and not binding on
lower courts. 109 Such a practice would mean that cases with plurality
opinions would have limited precedential value in future cases, unless
the future case had facts almost identical to the plurality opinion case.I °
No rules of law would flow out of the plurality opinion case that could be
used to interpret future cases.
The advantage of employing such a scheme would be that it would
end the confusion over how to interpret plurality opinions, simply
because lower courts would not be bound by the plurality opinions.
Lower courts could use the opinions as persuasive precedent, but could
also ignore the opinions completely. The plurality opinion would
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id. at 194.
105. See Hochschild, supra note 8, at 279-83 (discussing various lower court's
application of the narrowest-grounds Doctrine).
106. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745 (1994) ("[The Marks] test is
more easily stated than applied .... ).
107. See Hochschild, supra note 8, at 279-83 (discussing examples of lower courts
confusion).
108. See Thurmon, supra note 96, at 420.
109. See Hochschild, supra note 8, at 278.
110. See id.
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become similar to a dissenting opinion, in that it would merely be a non-
binding guide set forth by the Court on its view of the applicable rules of
law. The disadvantage, however, would be that many cases would have
limited precedential value."1 ' The Court would be deciding individual
cases, but not advancing specific rationales that answer the broader
questions of law. Producing merely a judgment with no binding opinion
might be seen as a waste of time by the Court, and inconsistent with its
history of interpreting the grand issues of law.
3. Making Plurality Opinion Itself Precedent
A third solution has been proposed under which the plurality
opinion itself would be the precedent from the case.' 12 This solution
directs the lower court to count how many Justices supported each
concurring opinion and the opinion with the most Justices would be the
binding opinion. 13 The concurring opinion with the most Justices would
be the "majority of the majority,"' 14 or the plurality opinion by
definition." 5 For example, a "majority of the majority" would be five
Justices vote for the judgment but three Justices write one opinion in
support and two Justices write a separate opinion. The opinion with
three Justices would have the most support and be considered the binding
precedent. Since this opinion would have the most Justices supporting it,
it would seem just to have it be the binding opinion.
An advantage of this solution would be that lower courts would not
have to choose between different opinions. Lower courts would simply
find the opinion that had the support of the most Justices and apply that
as binding precedent. The disadvantage with such a solution, however,
would be that the binding precedent of the Court would come from less
than a majority of Justices. Four or less Justices would be able to set
law, which is contrary to the democratic tradition of majoritarianism. 1
6
Another difficulty with this solution would occur when there are
two plurality opinions supported by equal numbers of Justices. Under
such circumstances, the rule would be unworkable, and lower courts
would be left struggling to decide which opinion to use as precedent.
111. See id.
112. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1600; Thurmon, supra note 96, at 448.
113. See Thurmon, supra note 96, at 449.
114. Kimura, supra note 7, at 1601.
115. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 922 (8th ed. 2005).




In addition to these three traditional solutions to the problem with
plurality opinions, scholars have also proposed more complex methods
of interpreting plurality opinions.' 1 7 Mark Alan Thurmon advocates a
hybrid approach, using a hybrid of all three of the traditional methods of
interpreting plurality opinions to achieve the fairest precedential
outcome. 18 His method relies first on finding the ratio decidendi of each
opinion.l 9 The ratio decidendi is the main reasoning of the opinion that
is needed to reach the result in the case. 2 ° Once the ratio decidendi is
found, Thurmon advocates looking to see if a majority of the Court
supports any of the ratio decidendis, even if the support is in separate
opinions.12  The ratio decidendis that have majority support would be
deemed binding precedent. 2   The ratio decidendis that do not have
majority support would then be considered persuasive precedent and
ranked according to how many Justices supported each. 1
23
The problem with this method is that figuring out each ratio
decidendi can be a complex and tedious task. Lower courts would have
to parse through each opinion and decide which reasoning is the ratio
decidendi, and if that reasoning was similar enough amongst all the other
opinions to garner enough votes to make it binding. Usually Justices do
not lay out their reasoning in a set manner, 24 and write opinions that
make it very difficult to decide what is their exact ratio decidendi.
Inexact application of Thurston's method could potentially create more
confusion than any of the traditional methods.
Another solution to interpreting plurality opinions has been
proposed by Ken Kimura. Kimura's "Legitimacy Model" interprets
plurality opinions by separating each type of opinion into five distinct
classifications. 125 He takes each of these classes of opinions and decides
which type would be precedentialy binding and which would not be.
26
The lower court would look at a plurality opinion and use it as precedent
117. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1610; Thurmon, supra note 96, at 4,51.
118. See Thurmon, supra note 96, at 451.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 422 (1992) (explaining the concept of ratio decidendi).
121. Seeid. at 452.
122. See id. at 452-53.
123. See id at 455.
124. Something as simple as the holding of the Court can be at the beginning of the
opinion, the end, or interspersed throughout the opinion.
125. See Kimura, supra note 7, at 1610-21 (The five classifications are incoherent
plurality decision, dual-majority plurality decision, narrowest grounds plurality decision,
complex plurality decision, and legitimate plurality decision.).
126. See id. at 1611.
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if it falls within a certain class; otherwise, the opinion would merely be
persuasive, non-binding authority.
12 7
The legitimacy model is problematic because of its inherent
complexity. Each category is fairly complex and requires a great deal of
parsing through each opinion to decide in which category it belongs.
This complexity can lead to opinions that might fit into more than one
category. If an opinion can not easily fit into one category, the method
fails and confusion about precedent continues. Another problem is that
some of the categories Kimura creates require that the opinions in those
categories are not precedentialy binding. This would leave, many
Supreme Court cases without any binding precedent, assuming they fall
within those categories Kimura does not consider precedentialy binding.
B. A Rule Change to Eliminate Concurring Opinions
It is clear that none of the current solutions provide a clear,
unambiguous solution to the problems surrounding plurality opinions.
Each of the proposed solutions assume that the Court should continue to
be allowed to produce plurality opinions. However, what if the Court
fundamentally changed the way it issued opinions? What if a rule was
enacted that would disallow the use of concurring opinions, effectively
eliminating plurality opinions completely? The Court would have a
majority of Justices agree on the judgment, and then would issue only a
single, majority opinion.128 The rule would not allow any Justice to write
a concurring opinion in addition to the single opinion of the Court.
The rule would be fairly straight-forward. After hearing a case, the
Court would be forced to come to a consensus on a single, majority
opinion of the Court during the decision-making process. If any of the
Justices disagreed on the reasoning in the opinion, they would not be
allowed to write a separate concurring opinion. They would either have
to convince the majority to rewrite the opinion of the Court, or not vote
for that opinion. The Court would then release a single, majority
opinion, eliminating plurality opinions altogether.
1. Enacting the Rule Change
The first question concerning any rule change would be its
constitutionality. The Constitution itself specifically mentions the
Supreme Court only in Article III, stating, "The judicial power of the
127. See id.
128. In France, and other civil law countries, it is the norm for the court to issue only
a single opinion, with no dissents or concurrences allowed. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REv. 133, 136 (1990).
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United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court .... ,,129 The
Constitution also mentions that the Court shall have a Chief Justice,' 30
but makes no further mention of the rules or functioning of the Court.
This silence suggests that the Framers had no specific rules in mind and
thought it best for the Court itself to adopt its own rules. In fact, the
rules of the Court have changed over time with no constitutional
challenge.131  There seems to be nothing concrete constitutionally that
would bar a rule change.
If the rule change is not blocked by the Constitution, there are two
main mechanisms for changing the Court rules. In most cases, the Court
itself makes its own rules as to how the Court operates. 32 These rules
lay out the daily functioning of the Court, covering issues such as
bringing motions to the Court, procedures for writs of certiorari, and
admission of attorneys to the Supreme Court bar.133 The rules cover all
aspects of the Court, and include a section on disposition of cases
through opinions of the Court. 34 Yet, the rules make no mention on
whether a majority of votes are needed to make an opinion binding, or
whether concurring opinions are allowed. The practice of issuing
concurring opinions is a tradition and has never been codified in the
Supreme Court's rules. While the rules are silent on this tradition, it still
could be altered through those rules.
The Supreme Court can change its rules with a simple majority
vote, issuing an order similar to an opinion in a case.1 35 Thus, the Court
could simply change its rules to state that no concurring opinions are
allowed in addition to the main opinion of the Court. This simple
measure would be easy for any Court to effectuate; it would simply rely
on garnering the support of five Justices to approve a rule change. While
logistically the rule change is simple, the tradition of concurring opinions
is so prevalent in the Supreme Court, that it would be a difficult task to
convince five Justices to approve such a change.
In addition to the Court changing its own rules, Congress also has
the power to change the Court's rules. Congress created the Court with
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and, in the past, has passed legislation affecting
129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I, cl. 1.
130. See id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (stating the Chief Justice shall preside over any trial for
Presidential impeachment).
131. Chief Justice Marshall changed the way opinions were issued, switching from
seriatim opinions to majority opinions. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18; see
also Supreme Court Order 551 U.S. (July 17, 2007) (revising the rules of the Supreme
Court).
132. See Court Rules, United States Supreme Court (2007).
133. See SuP. CT. R. 5, 10, 21.
134. See id. at R. 41.
135. See Supreme Court Order 551 U.S. (July 17, 2007).
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the Court. 13 6 Congress could pass a law stating that the Supreme Court
must issue only one majority opinion, and no other concurring opinions
are allowed. While this tactic is technically possible, it most likely
would be protested by the members of the Court. The Court, in recent
years, is so entrenched in issuing concurring opinions137 that it is unlikely
it would simply acquiesce to Congress' attempts to eliminate the
concurring opinion. The Court's only legal recourse would be to hear a
case challenging the law, and strike it down as unconstitutional.
This situation could lead to a constitutional crisis in which the
power of the Court would be pitted against the power of Congress.
Assuming the law was challenged and appealed all the way up to the
Supreme Court, it would lead to a number of issues. First, since the
Justices would be involved directly in the case, they would most likely
be required to recuse themselves. 138 Second, even if the Court heard the
case, it seems likely that the law could not on its face be deemed
unconstitutional. The Constitution is silent on the Court's rules and
nothing forbids Congress from changing them. 139 The only other valid
argument that could be made would be that Congress is infringing on the
separation of powers. 140 It could be argued that Congress is improperly
exercising its power over the internal structure of the Court, disrupting
the balance of powers embodied in the Constitution. This argument
could be used to strike down nearly any law Congress could pass to
change any Court rules of the Supreme Court.
Theoretically, Congress could pass a law changing the Court rules,
but most likely it would cause such controversy that Congress would
never attempt to pass such a law. The Court adopting a rule change on
its own would be the best way to change the rules to institute a single,
majority opinion and to ban all concurring opinions.
136. See Judiciary Act of 1789 (establishing the Court as a Chief Justice and five
associate Justices); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1-5 (laying out the number of Justices, term of
Court, and other rules relating to the Court); id. at § 1251 (setting rules on when the
Supreme Court will have original jurisdiction in a case); id. at § 2241 (giving Supreme
Court power to issue writs of habeas corpus).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (laying out criteria for judicial recusal, including having,
"[I]nterest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."); see
also Lori Ann Foertsch, Scalia's Duck Hunt Leads to Ruffled Feathers: How the U.S.
Supreme Court and Other Federal Judiciaries Should Change Their Recusal Approach,
43 Hous. L. Rev. 457 (2006) (discussing generally Supreme Court recusal).
139. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III; see also Arthur C. Leahy, Mistretta v. United
States: Mistreating the Separation of Powers Doctrine?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 209
(1990) (discussing generally separation of powers doctrine).
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2. Effects of a Rule Change
If the Court successfully adopted the rule, it would have significant
effects on the Justices themselves, the opinions issued, and the general
state of the law in the United States.
a. Effects on the Justices
The rule would impact the Justices' ability to write their own
opinions and to articulate their specific views on the law. With a
concurring opinion, Justices can go beyond what the majority opinion
states, thereby adding more depth, clarification, modification, and
personal nuance to the opinion. 141 The Justices can explore issues that
they deem important and that might be ignored by a consensus majority
opinion. 14  Prohibiting a Justice from writing a concurring opinion
would deprive them of this tool for discussing issues that might
otherwise be ignored.
One of the reasons there are so many concurring opinions is that
Justices want to express their own views on the case and the law in
general. 143 Most Supreme Court Justices have an independent streak and
shy away from merely going along with the majority.14 4 The concurring
opinion is a way for them to vote for an outcome in a case, but still add
their own view on the reasons the outcome was reached, instead of
simply going along with the majority. This is a change from past Courts
that thought it insulting to add a concurring or dissenting opinion unless
it was of significant importance. 4 5 Justices in the modem Court have
deviated from this tradition, and instead seem content to express their
own personal opinions without much restraint.
46
While eliminating concurring opinions might take away from
Justices' personal expression, it would also reinforce the ideal of the
Court as an institution, 4 7 not simply individual Justices espousing
141. See Ginsburg, supra note 128, at 143.
142. See id. at 143-44. See generally Ray, supra note 2, at 778 (discussing different
types of concurrences and reasons Justices choose to use them).
143. See Kelsh, supra note 14, at 166-67 (discussing how Justices are driven to
writing separate opinions to remain consistent with their own personal views, rather then
acquiescing to the majority view).
144. When asked what he thought about Chief Justice Robert's goal of achieving
more unanimity in the Court, Justice Scalia laughed and said, "Lots of luck." See Tony
Mauro, Scalia, Breyer Debate Unanimity on the High Court, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 13th,
2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 165917921878.
145. See Lusky, supra note 3, at 1139.
146. See Ray, supra note 2, at 778.
147. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
IN RETROSPECT 361 (1957) (arguing concurring opinions can lead to the Court losing its
prestige in the public).
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various personal views. The Court is a group of Justices that must come
together to decide issues of law, and, in many cases, must lose their
individuality to form a majority to decide cases. Traditionally, a
majority of the Court has always been necessary to make a binding
decision; 148 thus, the Court promotes consensus. The fact that a
concurring opinion written by a single Justice can be applied as binding
law in future cases 149 destroys that consensus. It also goes against the
ideas of majoritarianism 150 and calls into question the Court's status as an
impartial institution. Concurring opinions leave decisions more
meaningless and filled with Justice's own personal views, agendas, and
biases.
These two competing interests of the Justices, one of maintaining
their individuality, and the other of being part of a consensus of the
Court, are in direct conflict. Continuing to allow concurring opinions
would allow Justices to keep their individuality, but sacrifice the Court's
ability to speak with one voice and rule as a group. Eliminating
concurring opinions would allow the Court to speak as a group more
forcefully, but, in turn, would also sacrifice some of the Justice's
individuality. It is up to the Court to decide whether it prides its
individuality enough to keep concurring opinions at the cost of speaking
in a unified and forceful voice.
b. Effects on Opinions Issued
In addition to affecting the Justices themselves, abolishing
concurring opinions would also have a significant effect on the opinions
the Court issues. The addition of concurring opinions allows for more
Justices to sign onto an opinion. Justices might sign onto an opinion
because they know they can write a separate concurring opinion that
gives an alternate reasoning for the case. 5' Without the availability of
concurring opinions, many Justices might not vote for the majority
because they will only give their vote if they can also give their own
alternate reasoning. Eliminating the Justices' ability to do that will
almost certainly take many votes away from future cases, which could
change the outcome of those future cases.
Another change that might occur if concurring opinions were
eliminated is that many majority opinions might be watered down to
ensure they secure a majority vote. If a Justice can not write a
148. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23 (discussing majoritarianism).
149. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
731 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
151. See Ray, supra note 2, at 800.
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concurring opinion, he or she might only sign onto a majority opinion if
it is less broad and only touches on the issues with which he or she
agrees. Majority opinions might be written more narrowly to satisfy all
the Justices. This practice would restrict the Court from issuing broad
opinions that affect a broad area of the law. Instead, Justice's might
merely be deciding more individual issues that only affect the case at
hand, instead of addressing any larger issue of law. This situation would
have a negative impact on the Supreme Court, since it has traditionally
been seen as a body that operates to address the broad issues of law in
the country.
152
Despite the potential negative effects on the opinions the Court
decides, positive effects would also result from a rule change. While
opinions might grow narrower and address less broad issues of law, there
will only be a single opinion emanating from each case, as opposed to
multiple concurring opinions. The Court will speak with one voice and
issue a single view on what the law is and how it should be applied. A
rule change will eliminate the confusion lower courts struggle with in
trying to determine the precedential value of plurality opinions.153 The
Supreme Court would act as a single authoritative body that would issue
a single opinion. A rule change would also strengthen the public view of
the Court, and help to create a more stable and uniform body of
precedent.
c. Effects on the Law in General
The most far-reaching effect of eliminating concurring opinions is
the effect on the general state of the law in the United States. The
Supreme Court's main objective is not just to settle cases, but to answer
grand questions of law. 154 All lower courts look to the Supreme Court's
opinions to answer questions of law.155 In furthering this objective, it is
imperative that the Supreme Court clearly states the rules of law so lower
courts can follow those rules in a clear and uniform way. It has been
shown how plurality opinions confuse the Court's rulings and lead to
inconsistency and ambiguity in the law. 156  Eliminating concurring
opinions would make the law more consistent and clear.
All the confusing plurality opinions would simply vanish, because
there would be no plurality opinions at all. The Court would be forced to
152. See Baun, supra note 43, at 129.
153. See supra Part HI.D (discussing examples of confusing plurality opinion cases).
154. See Baun, supra note 43, at 129.
155. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2("[T]he Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact . .
156. See supra Part I.D.
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issue a single, majority opinion that would be the binding precedent for
lower courts. Instead of courts having to parse through the Supreme
Court's various split opinions, courts would have a single opinion to look
at and would have a much clearer statement on what the applicable
precedent is. The law, as a whole, would become more straightforward,
uniform, and clear.
The problem of circuit splits related to plurality opinions would be
lessened. Many circuit splits over plurality opinion cases are the result
of each circuit relying on a different opinion of the Court, with some
using the main opinion of the Court as precedent, and others using one of
the concurring opinions as precedent. 157 If the lower courts had only one
opinion to analyze, the circuit splits would be reduced, as they all would
be using the same opinion as precedent. While circuit splits would still
exist because the interpretation of Supreme Court opinions would still
not be the same in every court, the existence of only a single opinion
would make that interpretation clearer to lower courts, and, thus,
promote much more uniformity in the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Dissension in the Supreme Court does not seem likely to end
anytime soon. While the current Chief Justice strives for more
unanimity, 158 the rate of concurrences is still high, 5 9 particularly in some
of the current high-profile cases. 160 Concurring opinions in many cases
lead to plurality opinions that lack strong precedential value and produce
confusion in lower courts. 161 They also allow opinions signed onto by
less than a majority to become binding precedent. 162 While there are a
number of solutions to the problem of interpreting these plurality
opinions, all assume the Court must keep the tradition of concurring
opinions.
163
I believe the only way to solve the problem completely is to institute
a rule change eliminating the use of concurring opinions. While
concurring opinions are an established tradition in the Court, their abuse
in recent years has led to a divisive and weakened Court that issues far
too many confusing plurality opinions. A rule change is a radical step,
but the Justices seem too addicted to writing concurring opinions to stop
on their own. If concurring opinions were eliminated, it would first
157. See cases cited supra note 75 (showing a clear circuit split).
158. See Von Drehle, supra note 4, at 40.
159. See Harvard Stats, supra note 6, at 436.
160. See cases cited supra note 5.
161. See supra Part I.D.
162. See cases cited supra note 1.
163. See supra Part III.A.
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eliminate the anti-majoritarianism practice of opinions supported by less
than a majority becoming binding precedent. More importantly, it would
facilitate the Court in regaining its strength by only issuing a single,
majority opinion that would more clearly advance the rule of law and set
unambiguous precedent for lower courts to follow.

